



FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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PATTERN OF COOPERATION EMERGES FROM MOSCOW CONFERENCE

Nov. 1—As the *Bulletin* goes to press, news of the agreements signed in Moscow has just been received.

WHATEVER may be the agreement on details reached at the Moscow conference, the meeting will prove to have been a milestone in modern history if it results in the creation of machinery through which Britain, Russia and the United States can discuss and settle future divergences between them. It would be fantastic to expect that the three great powers, whose institutions and policies have been molded by widely different traditions, could reach, even under the pressure of war, a blanket consensus on all the critical issues of our times. Were such a consensus announced, in fact, its very impossibility would arouse justifiable skepticism. What we need today is not a valueless proclamation of eternal friendship but two tangible hedges against future conflict: the will to adjust such divergences as may arise, and the machinery through which prompt action can be taken to avert crises.

COMMON INTERESTS. The will to make mutual adjustments is being increasingly strengthened as the three great powers realize more and more clearly that only through their concerted efforts can the defeat of the German Army—shaken by setbacks in Russia but by no means yet crushed—be consummated in the shortest possible time. And just as the three great powers have a common interest in the defeat of Germany, so they have a common interest in the reconstruction of Europe which, in the absence of an accord between Britain, the United States and Russia, might fall prey to civil conflict that would complete the havoc wrought by war. Compared to these issues of war and post-war strategy specific problems of boundaries, important as they seem to individual countries or groups, are slight indeed.

Not only is there a will to cooperate, but the machinery for cooperation is already in the making. The Mediterranean Commission, first proposed by

Russia, offers a pattern for handling regional problems by small committees of experts representing specially interested nations and may prove of value in other areas of liberated Europe—provided regional arrangements are always fitted into the larger framework of continental and world organization. Russia was represented at the Food Conference held in Hot Springs last May, and will be represented at the Council meeting of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration which is to open in Atlantic City on November 10. These two conferences suggest another pattern of cooperation—this time of international gatherings dealing with specific issues, such as food and relief, which are of concern to all countries, large and small, and directly affect the lives of all people.

NO RIGID FORMULA. These developments in international machinery, so gradual as to have been almost imperceptible, demonstrate better than volumes of written arguments that cooperation between nations need not be rigidly confined to any one single form of organization. A variety of flexible mechanisms may be better adapted to the adjustment of the multiplicity of complex problems released, with explosive force, by two world wars in the lifetime of one generation. This is what President Roosevelt apparently had in mind when he said at his press conference on October 30 that he is in favor of a Senate statement on foreign policy couched in the most general terms, since it is impossible, at this time, to draw up a detailed blueprint for the future.

At the same time it is obvious that, unless piecemeal arrangements between various groups of nations on a wide range of matters are guided by a common objective and inspired by a common hope, they may prove, in the long run, so many jagged pieces of a puzzle that will never be fitted together into a coherent picture. The common objective is now, more and more clearly, an international organ-

ization which would have not only military power at its disposal to check future attempts at aggression, but also sufficient moral and economic influence to correct maladjustments and frictions that lead to war. The common hope, welling up from the hearts of peoples everywhere, is that the end of the war will not be marked by widespread reaction, as was the case after the Napoleonic wars, when the concert of Europe used the power at its disposal to throttle nascent revolutions, but by efforts to carry forward and enlarge the freedoms achieved by a few fortunately situated countries during the past century. True, internal reforms in the liberated countries cannot be effected against the will of their peoples, desirable as they may seem. The important thing is that such reforms as these peoples may want to effect should not be blocked by the victors through fear of change or dissension among them.

EXAMPLE OF ITALY. To take up again the symbol of Ignazio Silone, we are now at a point where the seeds of new aspirations are germinating beneath the crust of Nazi rule. The Allies can help

to sweep aside the dead leaves of Europe's many winters of discontent, and thus clear the ground for a fresh flowering of the continent—or they may let nature take its course, with the risk that the new seeds will not be strong enough to break, unaided, through the sod. Recent developments in Italy, which indicate that the Allies are using their influence to forward the aims of the liberal forces that are emerging into full daylight with the recession of fascism, hold promise for the future of other European countries. The present ferment in Europe could result in a clash between Britain and the United States, on the one hand, and Russia on the other. Such a clash, however, can be averted if the three great powers agree among themselves that, while they will not seek to oust the governments in exile until public opinion in the conquered countries has had an opportunity to express itself, neither will they use their influence in favor of restoring unwanted governments. On such agreement about future policy hinges the pacification of Europe following the defeat of Germany.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

GRANT OF SIBERIAN BASES MIGHT MEAN THEIR LOSS TO JAPAN

Considerable interest was aroused last month when Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., of Massachusetts was said to have told a secret session of the Senate on October 7 that one million American casualties could be averted if Siberian bases were available in the war against Japan. The general impression at the time was that, if this was an accurate report of the Senator's remarks, he must have had in mind the immediate use of bases by the United States which would almost certainly precipitate war between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, an eventuality Moscow has sought to avert. On October 27, however, he stated publicly that in addressing the closed meeting he had also expressed the opinion that the United States should not seek such bases until after the defeat of Germany.

THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS. There is widespread feeling in this country, which has probably been reinforced by current Soviet victories, that any diversion of Russian energies from the German front to the Far East would not serve the best interests of the

United Nations. President Roosevelt's remarks at a press conference on October 22 have presumably contributed to this understanding of the situation by enabling the public to see the issues still more clearly.

The President pointed out that if Siberian bases were made available, we would have to send troops, men and planes to take advantage of them. But, if the Japanese then launched an invasion of Siberia in an effort to forestall us, the U.S.S.R., although resisting, might find itself unready for war in that theatre. The Russians, he remarked, might say to us that they have more important things to do, that they have knocked the Germans down a couple of times and, if they do it three or four times more, may knock the Germans out for good. Implicit in these statements was the suggestion that it is not desirable to ask the Soviet Union to turn away from the front on which it is dealing such effective blows to the common enemy and that, if Siberian bases were granted at present, there would be grave danger of their being lost to Japanese troops.

BARGAINING OVER WAR FRONTS. The possibility of Soviet aid in the Far East is frequently discussed not in terms of Siberian bases but rather of an exchange of military pledges for the future between the Soviet Union on the one hand and Britain and the United States on the other. The question is asked: "Should we not bargain with the Russians, agreeing to meet their demands for an early invasion of Western Europe, if they will also agree either now or at a convenient moment to go to war with Japan?" Superficially this may appear to be a proper subject for bargaining, but it is important to recognize the

WHAT THE CHINESE THINK ABOUT POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION

Internal Economic Development, by Dr. Ching-chao Wu
China in World Economy, by Dr. Choh-ming Li
Post-War Foreign Policy, by Prof. Yuan Chen

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assumption behind the question — that an Anglo-American invasion of Western Europe will be helpful to the Russians, but is not essential to the maintenance of our own vital interests. If the logic were carried a step further, one would have to conclude that the defeat of Germany at the earliest possible moment—assuming that an invasion of Western Europe is necessary to achieve this end—is not of direct concern to us and that the only area in which we are genuinely interested is the Far East.

Not only is such a conclusion untenable, but analysis shows that in the military, economic and political field Germany is the decisive member of the Axis coalition.* Not until the war in Europe is over will the British and ourselves, in conjunction with the Chinese, be able to come fully to grips with Japan, for only then will it be possible to achieve the concentration of naval, air and land power necessary to overcome the special geographical problems of the Far Eastern and Pacific theatres. Consequently, our European and Asiatic military obligations, far from being in conflict with each other, have a clear-cut logical relationship in which the defeat of Germany provides the foundation for victory in the Pacific. In this sense, the blows struck in the Ukraine are also blows at Japan; and if the Russians are asked what contribution they are making to the war in Asia, they can properly point to their major contribution toward the smashing of the Nazi war machine.

OTHER AID POSSIBLE. This does not mean that we cannot expect any additional aid from the Soviet Union in the Far East, although it must be recognized that after the destruction of vast facilities in its western territory, the U.S.S.R. may not be inclined to expose its Siberian areas to the devastation of war. But even short of armed conflict the Russians may do many things to simplify the task of Britain, the United States and China in defeating Japan. Nor can it be forgotten that, although not fighting in Asia, the Russians are holding down in Manchuria the best troops of the Japanese Army—almost as numerous as the Japanese forces now engaged in China. This situation will become far more serious for Tokyo at a later date when, hard-pressed from many directions, it feels the need of reducing these Manchurian garrisons, but finds itself hampered by fear of possible Soviet moves.

In the last analysis, however, our Far Eastern military relations with the Soviet Union depend on the

speed with which we help to bring the European war to a conclusion, for the longer the conflict lasts in the West, the less aid will it be possible to hope for from the Russians in the East. Their future course in the Pacific conflict cannot be settled by an ultimatum over Siberian bases or by an "either-or" coupling of an invasion of Western Europe and a Soviet-Japanese war. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the Soviet Union has just as much interest as Britain and the United States in the destruction of Japanese militarism and the establishment of lasting peace in the Far East. But the manner in which it seeks to realize these objectives will be intimately related to its own strength after Germany's defeat, and the degree of political and military cooperation previously developed in the West.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

MR. WELLES' SPEECH AT F.P.A. FORUM

Because of the many requests for copies of the speech made by The Honorable Sumner Welles at the F.P.A. Anniversary Forum on October 16th, the speech has been printed for wide distribution. (Ten cents a copy, or quantity rates on request.) Please send your order to the F.P.A. office, 22 East 38th Street.

Japan Fights For Asia, by John Goette. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1943. \$2.50

A journalist's account of the war in the Far East with special emphasis on Japan's activities in occupied China. Adds little to what we already know, but will prove an interesting survey for the general reader.

The Far East and the United States, by Knight Biggerstaff. Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1943. 40 cents.

A bulletin for high-school teachers who wish to include more material on relations with the Far East in American history courses. Summarizes in simple form the main aspects of our historical interest in the Far East, American policy in that area, the war with Japan, and problems of post-war reorganization in Eastern Asia. Concludes with a series of study and discussion questions and recommended activities for pupils.

The Toughest Fighting in the World, by George H. Johnston. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943. \$3.00

An excellent description of the war in New Guinea by an Australian correspondent. Covers the period of a year following the outbreak of fighting in January 1942.

Mayling Soong Chiang, by Helen Hull. New York, Coward-McCann, 1943. 75 cents.


A brief appreciation of Madame Chiang Kai-shek by one who knew her in her student days.

The Story of Weapons and Tactics, by Tom Wintringham. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1943. \$2.25

A penetrating, popular account of changes in warfare "from Troy to Stalingrad."

*This question has been discussed in earlier *Bulletin* articles. See for example, "Japan Is not Stronger than Germany," January 22, 1943.

Washington News Letter



Nov. 1.—The war on Italian soil has been going forward long enough to provide the world with some understanding of the nature of Allied administration of liberated European territory. In two respects Italy will be a pattern for other freed areas. The military authorities will continue to make the interim political decisions about the areas; and the AMG will govern in the combat zones of Yugoslavia or France or Greece or Belgium, just as it is governing in the combat zone of Italy, where it is responsible to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief. In Washington's opinion the AMG, which administers all of liberated Italy except Sardinia and three Apulian provinces, Brindisi, Bari and Taranto, has performed the job well. Officers in a number far beyond the needs of Italy are being trained at many institutions in the United States for military government.

MODIFICATIONS PLANNED. However, it is expected that Allied civil authorities will provide the military in the future with explicit guides toward political decisions. The Military-Political Committee, which began life as the Mediterranean Commission, is destined to be the guiding instrument after the Moscow conference. Doubt about the existence of any United Nations foreign policy for the Mediterranean has been expressed in this country and in Great Britain. The Moscow conference gave the representatives of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union their first opportunity to discuss, along with the many other matters on the agenda, the problem of long-range policy in the Mediterranean.

Confusions arising from the division of Italian territory between AMG and Prime Minister Badoglio have disturbed Allied leaders intimately concerned with Italy. Badoglio and his Cabinet govern in the three Apulian provinces, where King Victor Emmanuel is monarch, and the AMG has no authority over them. Badoglio's government has denounced fascism but failed to repeal Fascist laws in the three provinces. Police subject to Badoglio's orders arrested the editors of a liberal newspaper by invoking regulations issued during the Mussolini régime. Count Carlo Sforza, former Italian Foreign Minister who returned to Italy after long exile in the United States, has demanded the punishment of Fascists still in office. His statement was published by the official government newspaper *La Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno*.

BADOGLIO PROMISES RESIGNATION. The

Allied Armistice Commission supervises the Badoglio government to insure compliance with the armistice signed by Italy on September 29, the full terms of which are being kept secret. The Commission has no authority to force the Badoglio government to release men jailed for violating Fascist laws, but by cajolery it gained release for the editors after ten days. On October 29 the Bari radio, subject to Badoglio's direction, broadcast that freedom of the press had been restored to the liberated areas as "one of the essential liberties of civilized people."

On October 20, one week after Italy declared war on Germany as a co-belligerent, Badoglio promised in an interview that he would select representatives of the various Italian parties for membership in a truly constitutional government when his capital was transferred to Rome, and that he would surrender his office as soon as a constitutional government was created. Badoglio and King Victor Emmanuel cannot establish themselves in Rome until the United States and British armies drive the Germans from the Tiber's banks and the AMG has completed its period of military administration. By that time, however, many important changes may have taken place. This was suggested on October 31 by Count Sforza's demand for the abdication of the King, and the statement of the well-known Italian historian, Signor Benedetto Croce, favoring the establishment of a regency under the Prince of Naples.

United States' policy in Italy has become an issue in American domestic politics. In a speech at Paterson, New Jersey, on October 30 Wendell Willkie, who is generally accepted as a candidate for the 1944 Republican Presidential nomination, accused the Administration of appeasing the "forces of reaction and Fascism all over the earth." Among those forces he included Victor Emmanuel.

French opposition to the status of co-belligerency for the Badoglio government, which for a while disturbed United Nations relations, subsided when General Eisenhower's representatives pointed out that the arrangement will speed the progress of Allied armies toward the liberation of France. The peculiar problems raised by Badoglio and King Victor Emmanuel, heads of a nation recently at war against the United Nations, are not expected to rise in other regions, unless the Allies should make the unexpected move of dealing with Marshal Pétain in France.

BLAIR BOLLES

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